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Abstract 
The network management protocol SNMP has its flaws,but it has not solved by itself. So other secure protocol must 
be borrowed to deal with the flaws of SNMP. It is a good method that the Secure Shell Protocol(SSH) can resolved 
the flaws of SNMP. In this paper the Secure Shell Security Model is constructed based on the SSH and analyzed its 
performance, which is good to the network security management. 
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1. Introduction  
SNMP has three editions, that is SNMPv1, SNMPv2 and SNMPv3. There was no security implemented 
in SNMPv1 and SNMPv2, because they were on community-based, and the community is plaintext on the 
wire. Because of the lack in the security function of the previous versions, addition with the development 
of network for the security management needs, SNMPv3 added security to the previous versions of the 
protocol by introducing a User-based Security Model (USM). But the HMAC-MD5 algorithm procedure in 
SNMPv3 is disclosed, and the authentication is only single direction, and the privacy key of DES is too 
short, just only 56 bits, which is attacked by hacker. So we can conclusion that SNMPv3 is easily to be 
attacked. While the security management of network system is not neglected, other security protocol 
should be taken into account to inforce network security management based on SNMP. It is a good idea 
that the Secure Shell protocol (SSH) is choiced to inforce network security management based on SNMP. 
SSH has three protocols, that is the Transport Layer Protocol, the Authentication Protocol and the 
Connection Protocol, it provides message confidentiality and integrity by using the Transport Layer 
Protocol , and it provides for both verification of the identity of the SSH server and verification of the 
identity of the SSH client by using the Authentication Protocol, and will establish a channel between itself 
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and the another SNMP engine by using the SSH connection protocol so that it can pass encrypted messages 
in the channel. The Secure Shell Transport Model(SSHTM) is constructed by using SSH. 
2. Motivation of SSHTM construction 
The SSHTM model will make use of the existing and commonly deployed Secure Shell security 
infrastructure. It is designed to meet the security and operational needs of network administrators, 
maximize useability in operational environments to achieve high deployment success and at the same time 
minimize implementation and deployment costs to minimize the time until deployment is possible. 
The SSH protocol permits that the SSH client will authenticate the SSH server and the SSH server will 
authenticate the SSH client (the user). SNMP can make use of the authenticated identities in authentication 
and auditing and access data in commision policy range. The SSHTM model supports different security 
infrastructure provides different security properties by utilizing SSH Authentication Protocol and SSH key 
exchange mechanisms. The SSHTM model uses SSH authentication methods including public key, 
password, host-based, keyboard alternation, using MIC GSSAPI, key exchange GSSAPI, GSSAPI, 
expanding key exchang, no authentication and so on. But the no authentication is not recommended. By 
using public key, that is based on host-based or password, the local account is supported. The password 
method permits integration deployment password infrastructure such as AAA servers using the RADIUS 
protocol. It should be able to take advantage of other defined authentication mechanism and future 
mechanism. 
Today a lot of Internet security protocols and mechanism are widely used and many of which have try 
to provide common infrastructure for different application layers. Construction of the SSHTM model is a 
leverage effect. It is desirable to use mechanisms that could unify the approach for administrative security 
for SNMPv3 and CLI(Command Line Interface) and other management interfaces. 
3. Construction of the SSHTM model 
3.1Extensions of the SNMP Architecture 
Construction of the SSHTM model can’t effect to SSH protocol and the other protocols of lower layers 
and it is only extension of RFC3411 and have no effect to SNMP. The extensions of the SNMP 
architecture (Fig.1) provide security service by using SSHTM model. 
Fig.1. the extensions of the SNMP architecture 
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From Fig.1, it is seen that the transport subsystem is added to the SNMP engine and the TMSM 
security model is added to the security subsystem, which is based on the SNMP entity. The transport 
mapping layer does not provide security functions and special security parameters for lower layers in 
[RFC3417]. In this paper by defining extendsions of the SNMP entity to modify [RFC3411] and 
[RFC3417], the transport mapping layer by using Abstract Service Interface(ASI) can transport special 
security parameters to other subsystems, including security name and security levels. The SSHTM model 
use the transport subsystem. 
3.2Construction of the SSHTM model 
The SSHTM model has two parts that are the Transport Mapping Security Processor(TMSP) and the 
Security Model Security Processor(SMSP)(Fig. 2). 
Fig.2 Construction of SSHTM model 
The TMSP is the portion that is part of the message transport that performs the actual security 
processing. The SMSP is the portion that realizes the appropriate security model required by the SNMPv3 
architecture. In order to provide the required services, it has to interact with the TMSP.  
The TMSP and The SMSP need to exchange information. While this can be realized in different 
ways,the simplest and most efficient scheme is to establish a cache which maintains information and to 
pass a handle between the TMSP and SMSP by extending the ASIs. Specific parameters for an incoming 
message can be determined from the transport layer by the TMSP, before the message processing begins, 
and for outgoing messages, the security-model-specific parameters are gathered by the MPSP and passed 
with the outgoing message to the transport mapping. 
4. Security capabilities of the SSHTM model 
4.1Security protection of the SSHTM model 
The Secure Shell Security Model provides protection against the threats identified by the RFC 3411 
architecture [RFC3411]: 
1.  Message stream modification - Provide for verification that each received SNMP message has not 
been modified during its transmission through the network. . 
2.  Information modification - Provide for verification that the contents of each received SNMP 
message has not been modified during its transmission through the network. Data has not been altered or 
destroyed in an unauthorized manner, nor have data sequences been altered to an extent greater than can 
occur non-       maliciously 
3.  Masquerade - Provide for both verification of the identity of the user on whose behalf a received 
SNMP message claims to have been generated, and the verification of the identity of the MIB owner. It is 
not possible to assure the specific user that originated a received SNMP message; rather, it is the user on 
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whose behalf the message was originated that is authenticated. SSH provides verification of the identity of 
the MIB owner through the SSH Transport Protocol server authentication  
4.  Verification of user identity is important for use with the SNMP access control subsystem, to ensure 
that only authorized users have access to potentially sensitive data. The SSH user identity will be used to 
map to an SNMP model-independent securityname for use with SNMP access control. 
5.  Authenticating the server ensures the authenticity of the SSH server that is associated with the 
SNMP engine that provides MIB data. Operators or management applications could act upon the data they 
receive, so it is important to know that the data is authentic. SSH allows for authenticaiton of the SSH 
server using the SSH public key. 
6.  Disclosure - Provide, when necessary, that the contents of each received SNMP message are 
protected from disclosure to unauthorized persons. 
7.  Replay - Provide for detection of received SNMP messages, which request or contain management 
information, whose time of generation was not recent.  A message whose generation time is outside of a 
time window is not accepted.  Note that message reordering is not dealt with and can occur in normal 
conditions. 
Besides above, the SSHTM model provides checking data integrality in order to prevent message delay 
and message reordering. The SSHTM model can hold back the-middle-man attack and IP connecting 
hijacker.
4.2Message authentication security 
The RFC 3411 architecture recognizes three levels of security: 
- without authentication and without privacy (NoAuthNoPriv) 
- with authentication but without privacy (AuthNoPriv) 
- with authentication and with privacy (AuthPriv) 
The SSHTM model provides support for encryption and data integrity. While it is technically possible 
to support noAuthNoPriv and authNoPriv in SSH, it is not recommended in the SSHTM model. This 
means that an SSH connection should support AuthPriv, which is the highest level of security defined in 
RFC 3411. 
The SSHTM model can get the identity of the user from SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS data 
packets and message type and transport address which are connected the message that is receive by SNMP 
engine. It will provide those informations to the message which is requested by SNMP engine. The 
SSHTM model can trust adequately the lower layer-SSH connection that is deployed properly and supports 
AuthPriv. It doesn’t understand much about algorithms and the open SSH session which is matched 
different security levels. But for they can operate mutually, supposed that a SSHTM model performance 
must use SSH connection for providing authentication service, data integrity service and encryption service 
so that the security level is the highest-AuthPriv. For a message which is requested by SNMP application is 
sent, if the security level is NoAuthNoPriv or AuthNoPriv, the SSHTM model will treat it as the hightest 
level-AuthPriv. 
4.3Authentication protocol security 
 The SSHTM model should support any user authentication mechanism supported by SSH.  This 
includes the three authentication methods described in the SSH Authentication Protocol - publickey, 
password, and host- based.  
The password authentication mechanism allows for integration with deployed password based 
infrastructure.  It is possible to hand a password to a service such as RADIUS [RFC2865]or Diameter 
[RFC3588] for validation.  The validation could be done using the user-name and user-password attributes.  
It is also possible to use a different password validation protcol such as CHAP [RFC1994] or digest 
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authentication [RFC 2617], to integrate with RADIUS or Diameter.  Any of these mechanism leave the 
password in the clear on the device that is authenticating the password which introduces threats on the 
authentication infrastructure which is less than ideal. 
GSSKeyexchange provides a framework for the addition of user authentication mechanisms which 
support different security infrastructures and provide different security properties. Additional 
authentication mechanisms, such as one that supports X.509 certificates which is added to SSH2. 
5. The SSHTM model security performance 
The performance of the SSHTM model has been evaluated by comparing it against SNMPv3/USM 
with authentication and privacy enabled, running over both TCP and UDP. In addition, to establish a 
baseline, the performance of plain SNMPv2c over both TCP and UDP was measured. 
5.1The security performance of SNMPGET 
The time of SNMPGET operation is seen from Table 1 under different security levels. 
Snmpsecurity level noAuthnoPriv AuthNoPriv AuthPriv 
snmpv2c/UDP 364   
snmpv2c/TCP 412   
snmpv2c/SSH 854 912 993 
snmpv3/UDP/USM 596 1332 2528 
snmpv3/TCP/USM 775 1666 3414 
snmpv3/SSH(NO USM) 986 1003 1230 
Table 1 the time of SNMPGET operation is seen from Table 1 under different security levels(unit:ms) 
5.2The security performance of SNMPWALK 
The time of SNMPWALK operation is seen from Table 2 under different security levels. 
Snmp security level noAuthnoPriv AuthNoPriv AuthPriv 
snmpv2c/UDP 546   
snmpv2c/TCP 633   
snmpv2c/SSH 996 1110 1373 
snmpv3/UDP/USM 532 1643 2856 
snmpv3/TCP/USM 896 2015 3189 
snmpv3/SSH(NO USM) 1013 1126 1486 
Table 2 The time of SNMPWALK operation is seen from Table 2 under different security levels(unit:ms) 
From Table 1 and Table 2 there is a clear difference in the time of data packets exchanged between 
TCP and UDP transports however the security level is NoAuthNoPriv, or AuthNoPriv, or AuthPriv. The 
time is bigger under TCP transport than UDP transport because the head of the TCP-based packet is bigger 
than the head of the UDP-based packet. Under the SSHTM model the time of is more snmpv2c/SSH and 
snmpv3/SSH than that of snmpv2c/SSH and snmpv3/SSH when the security level is NoAuthNoPriv 
because the SSH establishes a session key exchange. But the security level is stronger the time reduces and 
its strong points are seen, which is because the head of SSH data packet adds a little. The little head of SSH 
data packet is much less than the head of SNMPv3/USM. So it is said that the security performance of the 
SSHTM model is better than that of SNMPv3/USM. 
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6. Conclusions 
By constructing and applying the SSHTM model the network management security performance is 
enhanced. By analysing its security performance it is seen that the SSHTM model is better than 
SNMPv3/USM, so it is benenficial to the network management. 
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